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This paper examines the eﬀect of immigration on the level of income redistribution via majority voting
on the income tax. Immigrants have an impact on redistributive outcomes by adding to the size of diﬀerent
interest groups and by thus changing the composition of the voting population. The tax outcome depends
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determines the skill composition of immigrants. As a main result, we derive conditions for multiple tax
equilibria: if the skill composition of natives is not too homogeneous, both a high tax and a low tax outcome
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Non-technical summary
The importance of the subject of immigration into industrialised countries is mirrored in an extensive
literature. Part of the economic migration research - and a very hotly debated one in politics - is dealing with
the question of ’Is immigration - and how much of it and of which type - good or bad for the host (destination)
country?’ Apart from the labour market, the most prominent economic costs and benefits of immigration
are likely to occur in the public finance sector. For example, the amount of net (welfare) spending on
immigrants is an often raised issue in discussions on immigration policies in Western Europe. Besides, the
issue of immigrant participation in political decision-making remains contentious: in the current European
Union only five of all fifteen countries (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden) automatically
deliver voting rights to non-EU citizens, usually at the local level, and non does at the national level, where
the level of redistribution is to a large part determined. One might argue that this could be due to natives’
concerns over the power of immigrants’ votes to tilt the political majority on the level of redistribution and
attain an outcome that is unfavourable (non-optimal) for natives.
This paper determines the possible eﬀects of immigration and immigrant voting on the level of redistri-
bution in the destination country and, in consequence, derives the likely outcome of a native referendum
on these two policy issues. As in other studies on public finance eﬀects of immigration (see for example
Cremer and Pestieau (1998), Mazza and van Winden (1996) and Razin and Sadka (1997)), a political econ-
omy (voting) model is used. It is assumed that immigration and the level of redistribution are interrelated
in the following way: first, net income diﬀerentials between the destination and the source country induce
immigration, and second, the new, enlarged population votes upon the new income tax rate. In a world
where immigration is induced by net income diﬀerentials, the level and the skill composition of immigrants
will depend upon the income tax rate prevailing in the destination country. At the same time, in a direct
democracy where natives vote on the income tax rate together with non-citizen immigrants, the tax rate
chosen will depend upon the level and skill composition of those immigrants.
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Given these and other assumptions, we determine the equilibrium income tax rate (the equilibrium level
of redistribution) under immigration. We derive the interesting result of multiple equilibria for homogeneous
skill compositions of natives. This means that if the native population is neither predominantly skilled nor
unskilled, immigration could (but does not have to) be such that the outcome of the tax vote will be diﬀerent
from what it would be in the absence of immigration.
From there, we can determine the outcome of a referendum on immigrant voting among natives who are
trying to maximise their net incomes: they would vote against it if immigrant voting might lead to a change
in their preferred tax rate. Otherwise, they will be indiﬀerent. Besides, an unskilled native majority will
always vote for (against) immigration that increases (decreases) the proportion of skilled.
It is therefore shown that if natives are not heterogeneous enough in their skills, there is a case for native
opposition against immigrant voting. It is also found that there is actually a case where a native majority
might vote for immigration and immigrant voting, namely if 1) the native majority is unskilled and the
immigrant population is relatively more skilled than the native population and 2) the native majority is
strong enough to retain their preferred tax rate.
3
1 Introduction
The importance of the subject of immigration, in particular in the course of increasing economic integration,
is mirrored in an extensive literature. Within the last decade, an increasing amount of work has been dealing
with the redistributive eﬀects of immigration. The primary question there has been to what extent labour
mobility might cause fiscal externalities arising with fiscal competition, and to what extent it might even
hinder redistribution by national governments.2 In these theoretical analyses, the political decision-making
process is typically disregarded, and government policy is modelled with the help of interdependent utility
functions or social planner considerations.
More recently however, several studies on the public economics of immigration have begun to refer to
more realistic voting models of public policy. They take into account the impact that immigrants might have
on redistributive outcomes by adding to the size of diﬀerent interest groups and by thus changing the political
constituency of the native population.3 Along these lines, this paper provides an analysis of the possible
impact of immigrant participation on the voting outcome regarding the level of income redistribution. It
is related to Razin and Sadka (1997) in that it derives tax-voting equilibria under endogenous immigration
within a median voter model. At the core of the model is the following inter-relatedness between immigration
and the income tax rate: firstly, immigration is induced by net income diﬀerentials between a foreign and
a home country, and thus the tax rate, and secondly, the tax rate is (directly) voted upon by the new,
enlarged population consisting of natives as well as immigrants. The paper most importantly diﬀers from
Razin and Sadka (1997) by allowing for immigrants to be both skilled and unskilled, and by deriving tax-
voting equilibria under immigration analytically. Also, it addresses a closely related policy issue that, to the
knowledge of the author, has not been taken up in earlier studies so far: the impact of immigrant voting on
political outcomes as a possible determinant of natives’ preferences towards immigrant voting rights.
As a main result, we derive that with immigrant voting, multiple tax-transfer equilibria arise. That is,
2 see for example Brown and Oates (1987), Schwab and Oates (1991) and Wildasin (1991)
3 see for example Mazza and van Winden (1996), Cremer and Pestieau (1998) and Razin and Sadka (1997)
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immigrants’ votes can either increase or decrease the income tax rate - namely if natives are not homogeneous
enough in their skills. Then, the majority of natives would be against immigrant voting since it could alter
voting outcomes and tilt the political balance to what would be to them an unfavourable (a non-optimal)
level of redistribution. In a referendum, natives would therefore vote against giving immigrants the vote.
The model is a purely redistributive one and thus does not take into account possible welfare eﬀects of
immigration via diﬀerent channels, for example public goods, social insurance4 or the labour market5. Also,
we had to restrict ourselves to the case of exogenous wages67 in order to be able to derive equilibrium values
analytically. Extensions in these directions pose a challenge for future research.
A further, rather straightforward result in this model is that unskilled natives will vote for (against)
immigration if it increases (decreases) the overall percentage of skilled and thereby the net income of the
unskilled8, skilled natives will be indiﬀerent towards immigration.9 We derive the according result in a
normative analysis of tax outcomes: the (utilitarian) social welfare of natives is maximised under a high
(low) level of redistribution if mean income increases (decreases) with immigration.
The issue of immigration and immigrant voting is of high political interest and relevance. Welfare
spending on immigrants ranges among the primary concerns of natives in regard to immigration in Europe10,
and the question of how (or rather, whether) to incorporate foreign citizens in political decision-making
remains contentious. Although (legal) residents of foreign citizenship (henceforth called immigrants) are
4 for example on pay-as-you-go financed pension systems via a favourable age distribution of immigrants (see for example
OECD (1998a,b) and Razin and Sadka (1998, 1999a,b))
5 for example via the so-called ’immigration surplus’ (see Borjas (1994, 1999)), assuming that wages are decreasing in
immigration
6 In their model with endogenous education cost and resulting endogenous wages, Razin and Sadka (1997) resort to a
numerical computation of voting equilibria.
7The assumption of exogenous wages does not seem so distressing the light of the fact that the eﬀect of immigration on
local labour market outcomes has been found to be, if at all, modest in empirical studies (see for example Altonji and Card
(1991), Borjas, Freeman and Katz (1996), Card (1990, 2001), Kuhn and Wooton (1991), Lalonde and Topel (1991) for the US,
Pischke and Velling (1994), de New and Zimmermann (1994, 1999) for Germany, Hunt (1992) for France, Winter-Ebmer and
Zweimueller (1996, 1999) for Austria, Angrist and Kugler (2001) for Western Europe in general and, most recently, Dustmann
et al. (2003) for the UK). Of course, this still abstracts from a possible labour supply adjustment taking place for example via
the education decision (see for example Razin and Sadka (1997) and Casarico and Devillanova (2001)).
8This corresponds with the general empirical finding that the fiscal contribution of immigrants depends positively on their
level of educational achievement (see for example OECD (1997)).
9A growing number of OECD countries have stressed the importance of the attraction of skilled immigrants in recent years
(compare Coppel et al. (2001), p. 18).
10 compare the results of a quantitative analysis of parliamentary debates in European countries by Wodak (2000)
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granted the economic rights and duties of working and contributing to and (to varying degrees) receiving
welfare benefits, they are generally excluded from political decision-making at both local and national levels
and therefore from decisions on how (much) taxes are to be paid and benefits are to be spent. Of the
fifteen countries currently in the EU, only five countries (Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Netherlands, Sweden)
automatically deliver voting rights to non-EU immigrants, usually at the local level, and non does at the
national level, where the amount of fiscal redistribution is to a large part determined. This paper undertakes
to determine whether there is a case for natives to oppose or support immigrant voting out of redistributive
concerns.
The paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes the model and Section 3 carries out the analysis of
voting equilibria both for a closed (3.1) and an open economy (3.2) when immigrants either can or cannot
vote on the tax rate. Besides, the open economy analysis is extended for the case of two periods (3.3)
and endogenous labour supply (3.4). In Section 4, we address the issue of a referendum among natives on
immigration and on immigrant voting rights. A normative analysis of our results is discussed in Section 5.
Section 6 looks at the related literature and Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
2.1 The Economic Environment
There are two countries, home and foreign, with possible migration from the foreign to the home country.
The time horizon considered is either one or two periods - a more detailed discussion follows in the next
section. In each country, a single consumption good is produced only from labour input. In both countries,
there are two types of workers: skilled and unskilled. Initially, we assume that each type of worker supplies
one unit of labour at a reservation wage of zero. This assumption is relaxed when we consider endogenous
labour supply in Section 3.4.
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In the home country, high- and low-productivity workers diﬀer in gross wages ys and yu, respectively
(with ys > yu), which are exogenous. Similarly, in the foreign country, skilled and unskilled workers earn
(given) net wages eys andfyu (with eys >fyu). Wages of a given type of worker are lower in the foreign country
than in the home country. We consider an economy with perfect competition, wages are expressed in units
of the consumption good and equal the marginal (and, in our case of perfectly inelastic labour supply, also
the average) product of one unit of labour.
Because wages are lower in the foreign country, there is potential migration to the home country. The
migration decision of immigrants is endogenous, depending on international present value net-income diﬀer-
entials and moving costs. Immigrants have heterogeneous moving costs c, and c is assumed to be uniformly
distributed in the (foreign) population over [0, c]. The timing of migration is discussed in Section 2.2 below.
The government is redistributing income by levying a flat rate income tax (t) and granting a lump-sum
cash benefit (b). We assume that the government’s budget must be balanced in each period. Natives and
immigrants are treated alike fiscally: the tax revenue from the income tax t levied on unskilled and skilled
labour income of both natives and immigrants is redistributed evenly through the lump-sum transfer b, which
is granted to unskilled and skilled natives as well as immigrants. It is assumed that 0 ≤ t ≤ 1: a negative tax
rate that is eﬀectively redistributing income from the poor to the rich is viewed to be socially unacceptable
and implausible, whereas a tax rate t > 1 can be ruled out because people cannot be taxed by more than
their total income. Until Section 3.4 we eﬀectively assume individual labour supply to be fixed, the income
tax does not therefore distort individual labour supply decisions.
2.2 Scenarios and Timing of Events
In the following analysis of the equilibrium tax rate, we consider three scenarios:
1) A closed economy, that is one in which there is no immigration possible. It is therefore only natives
who vote upon the tax rate. This scenario serves as a base case scenario. In comparing outcomes between
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this one and the open-economy scenarios, we can determine whether immigration makes redistribution more
or less likely.
2) An open economy in a one-period time frame with immigration at the beginning of the period. We
analyse tax equilibria for both the cases when immigrants are and when they are not allowed to vote on the
tax rate.
3) An open economy in a two-period time frame with again possible immigration at the beginning of the
first period. Immigrants are not allowed to participate in voting on the tax rate of the first period, but are
only allowed to vote on the tax rate of the second period. We are interested in the eﬀect that delayed voting
rights have on the tax outcome. The idea is that immigration incentives and therefore equilibrium results
might change if immigrants cannot participate in voting from the beginning of their arrival.11 We will see
that the basic results of scenario 2) stay unchanged.
Below, we will now determine our two endogenous variables, the immigration rate and the tax rate.
Assumptions are such that the tax rate is determined in a direct democracy process by the median voter
(that is, the voter with median pre-tax income)12 . It will be the one maximising the median voter’s net
income. Median voter income, however, will change with immigration, which is taking place according to
international present value net-income diﬀerentials and moving costs, as mentioned above.
3 Analysis
3.1 Closed Economy
The proportion of skilled and unskilled natives is λns ,λnu, respectively, with
λns + λnu = 1 (1)
11 compare the demand for delayed participation of immigrants in welfare schemes, which is sometimes raised (see for example
Sinn (2002))
12 see Mirrlees’s (1971) classic model and Stiglitz’s (1982) adaption for economies with only two ability levels
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The government budget constraint requires that total expenditure via lump-sum grants is equal to total
tax revenue - or, equivalently, that per capita grant equals average tax payment:
b = t (λns ys + λnuyu) (2)
Individuals seek to maximise their utility given by their net income:
vi(t) = (1− t)yi + b, i = s, u
or, after substituting in for b:
vs(t) = ys − tλnu(ys − yu) (3)
vu(t) = yu + tλns (ys − yu) (4)
One can now see that the skilled prefer a tax rate of 0 (assuming that t ≥ 0), whereas the unskilled
prefer a tax rate of 1. Depending on whether there is a majority of skilled or unskilled in the population,
the outcome of majority voting on the tax rate will be 0 or 1:
t∗ =
½
0
1
if
λnu ≤ 0.5
λnu > 0.5
(5)
It is worth noting that the tax rate of 1 is an extreme consequence of the assumption of exogenous labour
supply together with zero cost of taxation. Only then, an unskilled majority would vote for the total taxation
of income and redistribution that results in an equalisation of net income across the whole population.13
3.2 One-Period Open Economy
13As soon as we relax the assumption of exogenous labour supply, we will find an upper limitation of the tax rate t < 1. For
more on this case see Section 3.4.
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3.2.1 Migration
In the open economy, we now allow for immigration to take place - so let us first have a look at how migration
decisions are determined.
Immigration is induced by the income gap between the net present value of income in the foreign country
(net of moving cost) and the net present value of income in the home country. So, there exists a cut-oﬀ level
of moving cost c for skilled and unskilled migrants, ecs and ecu, respectively, such that all those with moving
cost below ecs or ecu migrate, and all the others remain in their country of origin.
Given the cut-oﬀs, the amount of skilled immigration λms and unskilled immigration λmu is therefore
determined by migration costs in the following way:
λms = H(ecs) = ecsc (6)
λmu = H( ecu) = ecuc (7)
To simplify notation, we will set c ≡ 1 from now on.
The cut-oﬀs ecs and ecu are defined to equal net income diﬀerentials. This is because given free mobility,
migrants are indiﬀerent between moving or not when the net income gain from moving is equal to their
moving cost.
ecs ≡ (1− t∗) ys + b∗ − eys (8)
ecu ≡ (1− t∗) yu + b∗ −fyu (9)
And so,
λms ≡ (1− t∗) ys + b∗ − eys (10)
λmu ≡ (1− t∗) yu + b∗ −fyu (11)
Note that the cut-oﬀs, and therefore immigration, depend on taxes and benefits in the foreign country.
When immigrants find the net income diﬀerence to outweigh their migration cost, they migrate, otherwise
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they do not.
It can be seen that in this case, where migration costs are introduced, migrants do care about the tax
rate even when there is free migration. In contrast, in a case of free migration and no migration costs, net
income diﬀerentials would be zero and immigrant income would always be the equal to given foreign net
income eys and fyu, regardless of the tax rate t and the implied transfer b prevailing in the home country.
They would therefore not care about participating in the political process of the home country.14
3.2.2 Preferences over Taxes
With immigration, the skill composition of the population is likely to change. The proportion of skilled and
unskilled in the home country after immigration is now λns + λms and λnu + λmu , respectively, with a total
population of 1 + λms + λmu .
As in the closed economy scenario above, we require the government budget to be balanced and therefore
per capita grant to equal average tax payment:
b∗ =
1
1 + λms + λmu
t∗ [(λns + λms ) ys + (λnu + λmu )yu] (12)
Individuals’ utility is again given by their net income:
vi(t) = (1− t)yi + b, i = s, u
After inserting the budget constraint and restructuring, we get
vs(t) = ys − t
(λnu + λmu )
(1 + λms + λmu )
(ys − yu) (13)
vu(t) = yu + t
(λns + λms )
(1 + λms + λmu )
(ys − yu) (14)
14 see Razin and Sadka (1997)
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Individuals prefer the tax rate that maximises their utility, so as in the closed-economy case, the skilled
prefer a tax rate of 0 (assuming that t ≥ 0), whereas the unskilled prefer a tax rate of 1. Depending on
whether there is a majority of skilled or unskilled in the population, the outcome of majority voting on the
tax rate will thus be either 0 or 1.
3.2.3 Equilibrium
A political equilibrium is a (t∗,λmu ,λms ) such that (i) t∗ is the choice of the median voter, given λmu ,λms (ii) b∗
is satisfying the government budget constraint, given t∗,λmu ,λms and (iii) λmu ,λms are determined as described
in the section on migration above, given t∗, b∗. The identity of the median voter will depend upon whether
migrants can vote or not.
Migrants Cannot Vote If migrants cannot vote, the skilled will be in majority if
λnu < 0.5
the unskilled will be in majority if
λnu > 0.5
and the conditions for the outcome of the tax vote to be 0 or 1 are:
t∗ =
½
0
1
if
λnu ≤ 0.5
λnu > 0.5
(15)
This is the same outcome as in the closed economy. Again, this is a consequence of our assumption of
exogenous labour supply, since with the introduction of tax distortion where we have a diminishing labour
supply and tax base, the optimal tax rate will not only be upper-limited at some t < 1, but will also
depend upon the relation between mean and median income, which might change with immigration even
if immigrants are not allowed to vote because mean income in the population can change. In this case,
therefore, immigrants, through their impact on the labour market, might still change the optimal level of
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redistribution and the outcome of the tax vote.15
Migrants Can Vote If migrants can vote, the skilled will be in majority if
λnu + λmu < 0.5(1 + λms + λmu )
and the unskilled will be in majority if
λnu + λmu > 0.5(1 + λms + λmu )
The conditions for the outcome of the tax vote to be 0 or 1 therefore are :
t∗ =
½
0
1
if
λnu + λmu ≤ 0.5(1 + λms + λmu )
λnu + λmu > 0.5(1 + λms + λmu )
(16)
Proposition 1. If migrants can vote, there is a political equilibrium with no redistribution (t = 0)
if λnu ≤ 0.5 [1 + (ys − yu)− ( eys −fyu)]≡ λnu(0) and one with redistribution (t = 1) if λnu > 0.5 [1− ( eys −fyu)] ≡
λnu(1). Therefore, we always have multiple political equilibria when λnu(1) < λnu ≤ λnu(0).
These multiple equilibria arise because given a certain tax rate, immigration will be such that the tax
rate will be the one preferred by the (new) majority. Since immigrants make up part of the new majority,
both a tax rate of 0 and 1 is compatible with immigration - if the skill composition of natives is not too
homogeneous and their majority there is not too strong.
In comparing the open-economy values of required majorities λnu(0) and λnu(1) with their closed-economy
equivalents, we can answer the question of whether allowing migration makes a redistribution outcome more
likely or less likely.
We can see that if fyu > eys, we have λnu(1) > 0.5. It is predominantly skilled immigrants who join the
native population and vote for a tax rate of 0 together with unskilled natives. The minimum proportion
of unskilled natives necessary for a pro tax vote is larger in the open economy than in the closed economy.
Redistribution becomes less likely.
15 see Section 3.4
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If (ys − yu) < ( eys −fyu), we have λnu(0) < 0.5. The gross income advantage is smaller for the skilled,
and it is predominantly unskilled immigrants who join the native population and vote for a tax rate of 1
together with unskilled natives. The minimum proportion of unskilled natives necessary for a pro tax vote
is now smaller than in the closed economy, and redistribution becomes more likely.
Proof of Proposition 1. Recall that for t∗ = 0, it has to be true that
λnu + λmu ≤ 0.5(1 + λms + λmu ) (17)
or, after restructuring:
λnu + 0.5(λmu − λms ) ≤ 0.5 (17’)
Using (8) (after inserting (6)) and (9) (after inserting (7)) as well as the fact that t = 0 (and b = 0,
using (12)), the equilibrium conditions determining the migration rate of skilled and unskilled immigrants,
respectively, are the following:
ys − eys = λms (18)
yu −fyu = λmu (19)
The condition for the tax rate to be zero therefore is
λnu ≤ 0.5 [1 + (ys − yu)− ( eys −fyu)] ≡ λnu(0) (20)
For t∗ = 1, it has to be true that
λnu + λmu > 0.5(1 + λms + λmu ) (21)
or, after restructuring:
λnu + 0.5(λmu − λms ) > 0.5 (21’)
As above, immigration is determined by net income diﬀerentials between the foreign and the home
country.
If t∗ = 1, tax revenue is equal to total income in the population (taxation is assumed to be costless)
and is then distributed equally through lump-sum transfers, so that wages in the destination country will be
equalised, and arbitrage conditions are the following:
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(λns + λms )ys + (λnu + λmu )yu
(1 + λms + λmu )
− eys = λms (22)
(λns + λms )ys + (λnu + λmu )yu
(1 + λms + λmu )
−fyu = λmu (23)
Therefore,
λmu − λms = eys −fyu (24)
and we get the following condition for the tax rate to be one:
λnu > 0.5 [1− ( eys −fyu)] ≡ λnu(1) (25)
QED.
3.3 Two-Period Open Economy
In our third scenario, we evaluate voting equilibria with immigration and two periods, when immigrants are
allowed to vote in the second, but not in the first period. They take the first-period tax rate (which is voted
upon by natives only) as given and take into account the present value of net income in both periods when
deciding on migration. Thus, we seek to determine whether it makes a diﬀerence for natives if immigrants
are allowed to vote at once or only after a first period.
For this case of two periods, we have to review the relevant cut-oﬀs determing immigration. As before,
they are determined by aggregate present value net income diﬀerentials, whereby the first-period tax-transfer
scheme t∗1, b
∗
1 is taken as given:
ecs ≡ ½[(1− t∗1) ys + b∗1] + · (1− t∗2)ys + b∗2(1 + r)
¸¾
−
· eys + eys
(1 + r)
¸
(26)
ecu ≡ ½[(1− t∗1) yu + b∗1] + · (1− t∗2)yu + b∗2(1 + r)
¸¾
−
·fyu + fyu
(1 + r)
¸
(27)
In the following, we assume r = 0.
15
Tax preferences and majority requirements will be as before, and we can determine the political equilibrium
analogously to get the following
Proposition 2. If migrants can vote after one period, there is a political equilibrium with no redistri-
bution (t∗2 = 0) if λnu ≤ 0.5 [1− 2( eys −fyu) + (2− t∗1)(ys − yu)] ≡ λnu(0) and one with redistribution (t∗2 = 1)
if λnu > 0.5 [1− 2( eys −fyu) + (1− t∗1)(ys − yu)] ≡ λnu(1). Therefore, we always have multiple political equi-
libria when λnu(1) < λnu ≤ λnu(0).
Proof of Proposition 2. Recall that, for t∗2 = 0, it has to be true that
λnu + 0.5(λmu − λms ) ≤ 0.5 (17’)
Using (26) and (27) as well as the fact that t∗2 = 0, we get the following equilibrium conditions for
immigration:
[(1− t∗1)ys + b∗1] + ys − 2 eys = λms (28)
[(1− t∗1)yu + b∗1] + yu − 2fyu = λmu (29)
It therefore has to be true that
λnu ≤ 0.5 [1− 2( eys −fyu) + (2− t∗1)(ys − yu)] ≡ λnu(0) (30)
For t∗2 = 1, it has to be true that
λnu + 0.5(λmu − λms ) > 0.5 (21’)
Cut-oﬀs and therefore immigration are determined as follows:
[(1− t∗1)ys + b∗1] +
(λns + λms )ys + (λnu + λmu )yu
(1 + λms + λmu )
− 2 eys = λms (31)
[(1− t∗1)yu + b∗1] +
(λns + λms )ys + (λnu + λmu )yu
(1 + λms + λmu )
− 2fyu = λmu (32)
It therefore has to be true that
λnu > 0.5 [1− 2( eys −fyu) + (1− t1)(ys − yu)] ≡ λnu(1) (33)
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The rationing for the multiple equilibria outcome is the same as above.
Again, we can determine conditions under which a redistribution outcome becomes more or less likely:
Redistribution becomes less likely if (1− t1)(ys − yu) > 2( eys −fyu), since then we have λnu(1) > 0.5, and
the minimum proportion of unskilled natives necessary for a pro tax vote increases.
Redistribution becomes less likely if (2− t1)(ys − yu) < 2( eys −fyu), since then we have λnu(0) < 0.5, and
the minimum proportion of unskilled natives for a pro tax vote decreases.
Next, we want to relax the assumption of exogenous labour supply and see whether our basic conclusions
still hold.
3.4 Endogenous labour supply and the open economy
With labour supply being endogenous, that is, dependent on the tax rate, the optimal tax rate will be lower
than 1 because too high a tax exerts a negative incentive eﬀect on the provision of labour. To determine the
optimal income tax t for individuals with endogenous labour supply L(t), we again maximise individuals’
indirect utility v(t, b):16
vi(t, b) = 0.5 + b+ 0.5(1− t)2w2i
with respect to the same budget constraint b(t):
b∗(λmu ,λms ) =
1
1 + λms + λmu
t∗ [(λns + λms ) ys + (λnu + λmu )yu] (34)
This yields the following expression for the optimal income tax t(λms ,λmu ):17
t∗i =
1
(1+λms +λmu )
[(λns + λms )ys + (λnu + λmu )yu]− yi
2 1(1+λms +λmu )
[(λns + λms )ys + (λnu + λmu )yu] + yi
, i = s, u (35)
We can see that individuals’ optimal level of the tax rate depends on the diﬀerence between their income
and mean income. The lower their own income relative to mean income, the higher the tax rate they prefer.
16 see the Appendix for derivation
17 see the derivation of (59) and (60) in the Appendix
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Adversely, with increasing income individuals’ preferred tax rate decreases to zero when their income is equal
to mean income. Imposing the restriction that t ≥ 0, individuals’ preferred tax rate will be zero if their
income is equal to or higher than mean income.
3.4.1 Equilibrium
As before, with majority voting the tax rate will be determined by the median voter, who chooses the one
which maximises his or her utility. Depending on whether the median voter is skilled or unskilled, the
outcome of majority voting on the tax rate will be 0 or positive but smaller than 1.
If migrants cannot vote, the median voter will be skilled if
λnu < 0.5
and the median voter will be unskilled if
λnu > 0.5
So, again assuming that ys > yu and t ≥ 0, the tax outcome will be:
t∗(λmu ,λms ) =
½
0
1
(1+λms +λmu )
[(λnu+λmu )yu+(1−λnu+λms )ys]−yu
2 1(1+λms +λmu )
[(λnu+λmu )yu+(1−λnu+λms )ys]+yu
if
λnu ≤ 0.5
λnu > 0.5
(36)
We see that now, unlike in the case of exogenous labour supply, immigration might not only change the
equilibrium lump-sum grant, but also the tax voting outcome even if immigrants are not allowed to vote: the
preferred tax rate of the unskilled is increasing in mean income and decreasing in median income: if mean
income increases by more than median income, the preferred tax rate increases, if mean income decreases
by more than median income, the preferred tax rate decreases.18
If migrants can vote, the median voter will be skilled if
λnu + λmu < 0.5(1 + λms + λmu )
18 In a model with exogenous labour supply but endogenous skill acquisition, Razin and Sadka (1997) find the mean income
eﬀect dominating: the optimal level of the tax rate is found to be decreasing with unskilled immigration.
18
and the median voter will be unskilled if
λnu + λmu < 0.5(1 + λms + λmu )
The tax outcome then will be:
t∗(λmu ,λms ) =
½
0
1
(1+λms +λmu )
[(λnu+λmu )yu+(1−λnu+λms )ys]−yu
2 1
(1+λms +λmu )
[(λnu+λmu )yu+(1−λnu+λms )ys]+yu
if
λnu + λmu ≤ 0.5(1 + λms + λmu )
λnu + λmu > 0.5(1 + λms + λmu )
(37)
Proposition 3.With endogenous labour supply, if migrants can vote, there is a political equilibrium with
no redistribution (t = 0) if λnu ≤ 0.5 [1 + (ys − yu)− ( eys −fyu)] ≡ λnu(0) and one with positive redistribution
(0 < t < 1) if λnu > 0.5 [1 + (1− t)(ys − yu)− ( eys −fyu)] ≡ λnu(+). Therefore, we always have multiple
political equilibria when λnu(+) < λnu ≤ λnu(0).
Proof of Proposition 3. As before, for t∗ = 0, the skilled have to be in majority:
λnu + 0.5(λmu − λms ) ≤ 0.5
To determine the equilibrium levels of immigration, we need to proceed in the same way as above, using
(37) and (34) and solving (10) and (11) for t∗, b∗,λms and λmu . The only diﬀerence to be kept in mind is
that now, the optimal tax rate depends on not only on median, but also on mean income and therefore on
immigration t∗(λmu ,λms ):
(1− t∗(λmu ,λms ))ys + b∗(λmu ,λms )− eys = λms (38)
(1− t∗(λmu ,λms ))yu + b∗(λmu ,λms )−fyu = λmu (39)
For t = 0, nothing changes, and equilibrium migration levels are again:
ys − eys = λms
and
yu −fyu = λmu
As before, the condition for the tax rate to be zero therefore is:
λnu ≤ 0.5 [1 + (ys − yu)− ( eys −fyu)] ≡ λnu(0) (20)
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For 0 < t∗ < 1, the unskilled have to be in majority:
λnu + 0.5(λmu − λms ) > 0.5
Now, from looking at (38) and (39) we can see that we cannot solve for equilibrium levels analytically in
this case, since t∗ and therefore b∗ depend on λms and λmu and vice versa. However, we can still determine
whether we have multiple political equilibria or not:
From (38) and (39), we get the following:
λms − λmu = (1− t∗(λmu ,λms ))(ys − yu)− ( eys −fyu) (40)
The condition for the tax rate to be positive (but smaller than one) therefore is:
λnu > 0.5 [1 + (1− t∗(λmu ,λms ))(ys − yu)− ( eys −fyu)] ≡ λnu(+) (41)
Since we know that 0 < t∗(λmu ,λms ) < 1, we have λnu(+) < λnu(0).
Q.E.D.
4 Is Immigration and Immigrant Voting Desirable for Natives?
In the analyses above, we derived two main results: firstly, with immigrant voting, multiple voting equilibria
arise with respect to the tax-transfer policy, and secondly, immigrant voting can change native majority
requirements to a level above or below the ones in a closed economy and thus make redistribution more or
less likely.
Now, we can determine whether the majority of natives gains or loses from immigration and immigrant
voting and whether therefore, in a referendum, they would vote for or against it:
Proposition 4. In a native referendum by majority rule on whether to give immigrants the vote, natives
vote ’no’ if 1) λnu(1) < λnu < λnu(0) or 2) 0.5 < λnu < λnu(1) or 3) λnu(0) < λnu < 0.5. The outcome of the
referendum is indeterminate in all other cases.
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Proof of Proposition 4. If immigrant voting changes the tax rate, then by definition, the majority of
natives will be worse oﬀ.19 In a referendum, natives would therefore vote against immigrant voting rights. If
the tax rate is not changed, natives will be indiﬀerent, and the referendum outcome would be indeterminate.
Proposition 5. In a native referendum by majority rule on whether to allow immigration, the outcome
is indeterminate for λnu < 0.5. For λnu > 0.5, natives vote ’yes’ if
λms
λmu
>
λns
λnu
and ’no’ if λ
m
s
λmu
<
λns
λnu
, the outcome
is indeterminate if λ
m
s
λmu
=
λns
λnu
.
Proof of Proposition 5. Natives’ utility is aﬀected by immigration, even if immigrants are not allowed
to vote on the tax rate, via a change in mean income, which aﬀects the lump-sum transfer b∗.
According to the skill composition of the native population, we can distinguish between the following
two cases:
1) For λnu < 0.5, there is no redistribution (t∗ = 0 and b∗ = 0), and the native (skilled) majority is
indiﬀerent.
2) For λnu > 0.5, there is redistribution (t∗ = 1), and the native (unskilled) majority will be against (in
favour) of immigration, if b∗ goes down (up). From looking at the government budget constraints of the open
and the closed economy, (12) and (2), we can see that this is the case if with immigration, the aggregate
proportion of skilled decreases (increases), that is iﬀ λ
n
s+λ
m
s
1+λms +λmu
< λns (
λns+λ
m
s
1+λms +λmu
> λns ) or, equivalently, iﬀ
λms
λmu
<
λns
λnu
(λ
m
s
λmu
>
λns
λnu
). The lump-sum transfer b∗ will stay constant if immigration is such that λ
m
s
λmu
=
λns
λnu
; in
this case, the native majority will be indiﬀerent.
Proposition 4’. With endogenous labour supply, in a native referendum by majority rule on whether
to give immigrants the vote, natives vote ’no’ if 1) λnu(+) < λnu < λnu(0) or 2) 0.5 < λnu < λnu(+) or 3)
λnu(0) < λnu < 0.5. They are indiﬀerent in all other cases.
19This is because the prevailing tax rate is utility-maximising for the median voter and therefore the majority of natives.
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Proof of Proposition 4’. As above in Proposition 4, the majority of natives will be worse oﬀ, if
immigrant voting changes the tax rate. Although now, the optimal tax rate changes with immigration, and
the prevailing tax rate is not necessarily the utility-maximising one for the majority of natives, a skilled
(unskilled) majority will still always prefer a zero (positive) tax rate and will oppose any according change
in the voting outcome. This is because mean income will always be below (above) median income of ys (yu )
with a skilled (unskilled) native majority.20
Proposition 5’. With endogenous labour supply, in a native referendum by majority rule on whether to
allow immigration, the outcome is indeterminate for λnu < 0.5. For λnu > 0.5, natives vote ’yes’ if
λms
λmu
>
λns
λnu
and ’no’ if λ
m
s
λmu
<
λns
λnu
; the outcome is indeterminate if λ
m
s
λmu
=
λns
λnu
.
Proof of Proposition 5’. Natives’ utility is aﬀected by immigration even in the absence of immigrant
voting rights via a change in mean income, which aﬀects the tax level optimal for natives t∗ as well as the
lump-sum transfer b∗.21
According to the skill composition of the native population, we can distinguish between the following
two cases:
1) For λnu < 0.5, there is no redistribution (t∗ = 0 and b∗ = 0), and the native (skilled) majority is
indiﬀerent. It does not care about the skill mix of immigrants.22
2) For λnu > 0.5, immigration does not change mean income and the tax rate if
λms
λmu
=
λns
λnu
. In this case, the
native (unskilled) majority is indiﬀerent because immigration does not change the skill mix. Immigration
changes the preferred level of a positive tax rate of natives if mean income changes. The unskilled native
20 compare the formula for the optimal tax rate in (35)
21Note that, since wages are exogenous and immigrants are not allowed to vote, immigration has no impact on median voter
income, and changes in the optimal level of the tax rate are solely due to changes in mean income.
22Note that as immigration has no impact on median voter income, it cannot change the preferred level of the tax rate from
zero to positive. For this to happen, mean income would have to rise from below to above median income which is constant at
ys. (see Proof of Proposition 4’ above)
22
majority will vote for immigration if λ
m
s
λmu
>
λns
λnu
and mean income, and thus t∗ and b∗, increase. Similarly, it
will be against immigration if λ
m
s
λmu
<
λns
λnu
and mean income, and thus t∗ and b∗, decrease.23
To sum up, both in the case of exogenous and endogenous labour supply, an unskilled native majority
will be for (against) immigration, if mean income increases (decreases), that is if immigrants are relatively
more (less) skilled than natives. A skilled majority will be indiﬀerent towards immigration. If, however,
immigrants’ voting power might alter the outcome of the tax vote t, natives will always be against immigrant
voting.
5 Normative analysis
We might be interested in judging upon the social desirability of derived equilibrium tax-transfer policies
from a welfare point of view. In our direct democracy model, equilibrium tax choices are always eﬃcient in a
Pareto sense, since they maximise median voter utility. In changing the tax rate, nobody can be made better
oﬀ without making at least the median voter worse oﬀ.24 This welfare criterion, however, does not allow
the comparison of diﬀerent levels of utility or gains and losses that arise from changes in the tax rate. To
achieve this objective, a stronger welfare criterion is necessary, where some interpersonal utility comparison
has to be made. Because we have assumed quasi-linear preferences, the natural welfare criterion over t is
the sum of individual utilities in the standard utilitarian form W (t) =
IP
i=1
U i(t). Any tax-transfer policy for
which W (t∗) ≥W (t), t 6= t∗ is potentially pareto-eﬃcient, since in changing the tax rate from any t to t∗, all
losers could be fully compensated by some lump-sum transfers while the gainers are left strictly better oﬀ.
In the following, we compute the socially optimal tax rate t∗∗ in a closed and in an open economy - in
turn for the case of exogenous and endogenous labour supply.
23For the same reason as above, immigrants cannot change the preferred level of the tax rate from positive to zero. For this to
happen, mean income would have to fall from above to below median income which is constant at yu. (see Proof of Proposition
4’ above)
24 see Besley and Coate (1998)
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5.1 Exogenous labour supply
Proposition 6. If labour supply is exogenous, any tax rate 0 ≤ t∗∗ ≤ 1 is socially eﬃcient for natives.
Therefore, any tax vote by majority rule is eﬃcient for natives in a closed economy. In an open economy,
the eﬃcient tax rate t∗∗ = 1 if λ
m
s
λmu
>
λns
λnu
and t∗∗ = 0 if λ
m
s
λmu
<
λns
λnu
. Therfore, immigrant voting can change
an eﬃcient tax vote into an ineﬃcient one and vice versa when λnu(1) < λnu < λnu(0).
Proof of Proposition 6.
Closed economy25
In a closed economy where labour supply is exogenous and preferences are quasi-linear, social welfare
does not depend on the income tax at all. This is intuitively plausible since any amount of tax revenue
is redistributed among the native population without any cost in aggregate utility. Any tax rate would
therefore be eﬃcient.
First, with quasi-linear preferences for all individuals i, no individual can gain more than another by a
given increase in the lump-sum transfer b. The increase in individual utility arising from any given increase
in b is independent of income.
Second, with fixed labour supply, the tax base is constant in t. This guarantees that there is no work
disincentive eﬀect from taxation, and no eﬃciency loss.
Open economy26
For an open economy, we get the following result:
A tax rate of 1 is eﬃcient if
λns ys + λnuyu <
(λns + λms )ys + (λnu + λmu )yu
1 + λms + λmu
(42)
and a tax rate of 0 is eﬃcient if
λns ys + λnuyu >
(λns + λms )ys + (λnu + λmu )yu
1 + λms + λmu
(43)
25 see the Appendix for derivation
26 see the Appendix for derivation
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That is, in an open economy, utilitarian social welfare of natives is maximised under a tax rate of 1 if
mean income increases with immigration. It is maximised under a tax rate of 0 if mean income decreases
with immigration. QED.
This result is intuitively plausible since with an increase in mean income, per capita tax revenue increases
for any given t, and every native is better oﬀ due to a higher lump-sum benefit b. There is a net redistribution
of income from immigrants to natives. A tax rate of 1 maximises aggregate native utility.
With a decrease in mean income, it is the other way around: for any given t, per capita tax revenue and
therefore b decreases. Income is eﬀectively redistributed away from natives to immigrants. A tax rate of 0
therefore maximises aggregate native utility.
Now, does majority voting among natives yield the socially eﬃcient tax rate for natives in an open
economy? For this, recall our results from Section 3.2 and Section 4:
1) A native unskilled majority λnu > λnu(0) > 0.5 votes for a tax rate of 1. It votes for immigration only
if it increases mean income. The tax vote is eﬃcient.
2) A native skilled majority λnu < λnu(1) < 0.5 votes for a tax rate of 0. It is indiﬀerent towards
immigration. Therefore, if immigration is such that mean income increases, the tax vote is not eﬃcient; if
mean income decreases, it is.
3) If the proportion of native unskilled λnu is such that λnu(1) < λnu < λnu(0), natives will oppose immi-
gration. If immigration does take place, whether or not a native tax vote is eﬃcient again depends on the
skill composition of immigrants - as derived above, a tax rate of 1 (0) is eﬃcient if mean income increases
(decreases) with immigration.
Do these eﬃciency results of majority voting change when immigrants are allowed to vote together with
natives? Let us reconsider briefly the relevant cases above:
If the native population is relatively homogeneous, as in 1) and 2), results stay the same, since immigrants’
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voting does not change the voting outcome.
If the native population is relatively heterogeneous, as in 3), the outcome of the tax vote becomes
indeterminate with immigration. If immigrant voting changes the tax outcome, it changes an eﬃcient tax
rate into an ineﬃcient one and vice versa.
5.2 Endogenous labour supply
Proposition 6’. For the socially eﬃcient tax rate for natives t∗∗ it is true that 0 < t∗∗ < t∗ both in a
closed and in an open economy if labour supply is endogenous. Therefore, any tax vote by majority rule is
ineﬃcient for natives, whether immigrants are allowed to vote or not.
Proof of Proposition 6’.
Closed economy
Using individual utility which is now given by27
vi(t, b) = 0.5 + b+ 0.5(1− t)2w2i
and inserting the budget constraint
b = t(λns ys + λnuyu)
we get the following individual utility function
ui(t) = 0.5 + t(λns ys + λnuyu) + 0.5(1− t)2w2i
or, after substituting for ys and yu
ui(t) = 0.5 + t(1− t)(λnsw2s + λnuw2u) + 0.5(1− t)2w2i
Using a utilitarian welfare function for natives of the form
W (t) = λnsus(t) + λnuuu(t)
and substituting in, we get
W (t) = 0.5 + t(1− t)(λnsw2s + λnuw2u) + 0.5(1− t)2(w2s + w2u)
27 see the Appendix
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From the first derivative
W 0(t) = (1− 2t)(λnsw2s + λnuw2u)− t(w2s + w2u)
we derive the welfare-maximising tax rate
t∗∗ =
λnsw2s + λnuw2u
2(λnsw2s + λnuw2u) + (w2s + w2u)
or
t∗∗ =
λns ys + λnuyu
2(λns ys + λnuyu) + (ys + yu)
(44)
Open economy
Again using individual utility of the form
vi(t, b) = 0.5 + b+ 0.5(1− t)2w2i
and inserting the budget constraint for an open economy
b =
1
1 + λms + λmu
t [(λns + λms ) ys + (λnu + λmu )yu]
we get the following individual utility function
ui(t) = 0.5 +
1
1 + λms + λmu
t [(λns + λms ) ys + (λnu + λmu )yu] + 0.5(1− t)2w2i
or, after substituting for ys and yu
ui(t) = 0.5 +
1
1 + λms + λmu
t(1− t)
£
(λns + λms )w2s + (λnu + λmu )w2u
¤
+ 0.5(1− t)2w2i
Using the same utilitarian welfare function for natives
W (t) = λnsus(t) + λnuuu(t)
and substituting in, we get
W (t) = 0.5 +
1
1 + λms + λmu
t(1− t)
£
(λns + λms )w2s + (λnu + λmu )w2u
¤
+ 0.5(1− t)2(w2s + w2u)
From the first derivative
W 0(t) =
1
1 + λms + λmu
(1− 2t)
£
(λns + λms )w2s + (λnu + λmu )w2u
¤
− t(w2s + w2u)
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we derive the welfare-maximising tax rate
t∗∗ =
(λns + λms )w2s + (λnu + λmu )w2u
2 [(λns + λms )w2s + (λnu + λmu )w2u] + (w2s + w2u)(1 + λms + λmu )
or
t∗∗ =
(λns + λms ) ys + (λnu + λmu )yu
2 [(λns + λms ) ys + (λnu + λmu )yu] + (ys + yu)(1 + λms + λmu )
(45)
Both for an open and a closed economy, the socially eﬃcient tax rate is always positive and smaller than
1. This is intuitively plausible since firstly, a tax rate of 1 would cause an eﬃciency loss via a distortion of
labour supply which would decrease to zero28, with a total depletion of the tax base. Secondly, a positive
tax rate is potentially pareto-superior to a tax rate of 0 because the utility gain of the unskilled from an
increase in their net income can more than oﬀset the net utility loss of the skilled from a decrease in their
net income. This is because for any given increase in the tax rate, the skilled can make up for part of their
utility loss by substituting part of their time away from labour to leisure according to their preferences.
We see that any tax vote is ineﬃcient both in a closed and an open economy, since a tax vote of zero will
always be too low and a positive tax vote will always be too high: t∗∗ < t∗.29
6 Related literature
Other studies have also used a political economy approach to analyse the eﬀect of immigration on public policy
variables of the host country. For example, Mazza and van Winden (1996) find that transfers and disposable
income for mobile workers can increase with immigration. In an analysis of voting on social insurance
contributions, Cremer and Pestieau (1998) find that when the poor (rich) are mobile, the contribution
rate decreases (increases) when benefits are increasingly strongly related to earnings. The paper of Razin
and Sadka (1997) is perhaps most closely related to the present paper, since it also analyses the interaction
28 see (53) in the Appendix
29 compare (44) with (61) for a closed economy and (45) with (35) for an open economy
28
between migration and the political-economy equilibrium tax-transfer policy in the host country. There, too,
net income diﬀerentials and therefore the prevailing tax rate in the destination country induce immigration,
which changes the median voter’s income and tax preference. It is found that unskilled migration may lead
to a lower tax and less redistribution than no migration.
The present paper is diﬀerent in that it allows for both skilled and unskilled immigrants and analytically
derives the conditions for a high-tax and a low-tax equilibrium. It is found that immigration is compatible
with both a high and a low tax rate for certain skill compositions of natives.
7 Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to determine the eﬀect of immigration on the level of income redistribution via
majority voting, given that immigration is endogenous and immigrants can be both skilled and unskilled.
The tax outcome depends on the skill composition of natives and the initial amount of redistribution in
the economy, which in turn determines the skill composition of immigrants. Accordingly, if immigrants
are allowed to vote, they might either join the high-redistribution interest group (the unskilled) or the
low-redistribution interest group (the skilled). It is found, firstly, that the probability for redistribution
can increase or decrease and secondly, that for certain skill compositions of natives, both a high and a
low equilibrium tax rate is compatible with immigration. Immigrant voting can then change the political
majority. As a consequence, we can determine the gainers and losers within the native community from an
extension of the franchise. If immigrant voting can change the political majority, the majority of natives
can end up with a tax rate that makes them worse oﬀ. They will then oppose an extension of the franchise
to immigrants, and a corresponding referendum would be defeated. For a percentage of skilled or unskilled
natives above a certain threshold, however, immigrant voting does not matter for the outcome of the vote.
Non-citizen voting on a national level is currently denied in all European Union countries. According
to the findings in this paper, natives will oppose immigrant voting if their majority on the level of income
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redistribution is not strong enough. At best, natives are indiﬀerent towards immigrant voting. As far as
immigration itself is concerned, a native majority would gain from it and therefore vote for it, if it itself was
unskilled and immigrants were relatively higher skilled than natives.
APPENDIX
Endogenous Labour Supply30
In the following, optimal income taxation is derived for the case of endogenous labour supply in an open
economy.
Let individual preferences be described by the following (direct) utility function
u(c, l) = c+ l − l2/2 (46)
with consumption c and leisure l. The individual time constraint is
l + L = 1 (47)
with work L, and the individual budget constraint is
c = (1− t)wiL+ b (48)
with individual pre-tax hourly wage wi, a lump sum benefit or grant b or, using (47):
c = (1− t)wi − (1− t)wil + b (49)
Substitute c in the utility function to get utility as a function of leisure:
ui(l) = (1− t)wi − (1− t)wil + b+ l − l2/2 (50)
Solving the foc
u0i(l) = 1− (1− t)wi − l = 0 (51)
for l to derive leisure demand,
li = 1− (1− t)wi (52)
30Ben Lockwood, unpublished lecture notes, 2002
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labour supply
Li = 1− li = (1− t)wi (53)
and pre-tax income:
yi = (1− t)w2i (54)
Insert (52) in (50) to get indirect utility as a function of the tax rate and the lump sum grant vi(t, b):
vi(t, b) = 0.5 + b+ 0.5(1− t)2w2i (55)
Again, feasible redistribution policy must satisfy the government budget constraint:
b = t
·
(λns + λms )
(1 + λms + λmu )
ys +
(λnu + λmu )
(1 + λms + λmu )
yu
¸
(12)
Inserting (54) in (12) yields:
b = t(1− t) 1
(1 + λms + λmu )
£
(λns + λms )w2s + (λnu + λmu )w2u
¤
(56)
Insert (56) in (55) to get indirect utility as a function of the tax rate vi(t):
vi(t) = 0.5 + t(1− t)
1
(1 + λms + λmu )
£
(λns + λms )w2s + (λnu + λmu )w2u
¤
+ 0.5(1− t)2w2i (57)
with the first order condition:
v0i(t) = (1− 2t)
1
(1 + λms + λmu )
£
(λns + λms )w2s + (λnu + λmu )w2u
¤
− (1− t)w2i = 0, i = s, u (58)
Solving for t yields the optimal tax rate, that is the one which maximises indirect utility vi(t):
t∗s =
1
(1+λms +λmu )
£
(λns + λms )w2s + (λnu + λmu )w2u
¤
− w2s
2 1(1+λms +λmu )
[(λns + λms )w2s + (λnu + λmu )w2u] + w2s
(59)
t∗u =
1
(1+λms +λmu )
£
(λns + λms )w2s + (λnu + λmu )w2u
¤
− w2u
2 1(1+λms +λmu )
[(λns + λms )w2s + (λnu + λmu )w2u] + w2u
(60)
QED.
Note that for a closed economy, where λms ,λmu = 0, we would derive analogously:
t∗i =
λnsw2s + λnuw2u − w2i
2(λnsw2s + λnuw2u) + w2i
(61)
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Normative Analysis for Exogenous Labour Supply - Closed Economy
We have individual utility given by individual net income:
vi(t) = (1− t)yi + b, i = s, u (62)
where the lump-sum grant b has to satisfy the government budget constraint
b = t (λns ys + λnuyu) (2)
Skilled and unskilled utility Us(t) and Uu(t) therefore is
Us(t) = (1− t)ys + t (λns ys + λnuyu) (63)
Uu(t) = (1− t)yu + t (λns ys + λnuyu) (64)
with 0 ≤ t ≤ 1.
If we are interested in native welfare only, our social welfare function W (t) is
W (t) = λnsUs(t) + λnuUu(t) (65)
or, after substituting,
W (t) = λns [(1− t)ys + t (λns ys + λnuyu)] + λnu [(1− t)yu + t (λns ys + λnuyu)] (66)
and restructuring
W (t) = (1− t) (λns ys + λnuyu) + t (λns ys + λnuyu) (67)
or, equally
W = λns ys + λnuyu (68)
So, social welfare does not depend upon the tax rate in a closed economy with exogenous labour supply.
Normative Analysis for Exogenous Labour Supply - Open Economy
We take individual utility as given above, assuming exogenous labour supply. The government budget
constraint, however, now becomes
b =
1
1 + λms + λmu
t [(λns + λms )ys + (λnu + λmu )yu] (12)
Again, we are interested in native welfare only, so our relevant social welfare function is
W (t) = λnsUs(t) + λnuUu(t) (65)
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or, after substituting and restructuring
W (t) = λns ys + λnuyu − t
·
(λns ys + λnuyu)−
1
1 + λms + λmu
[ys(λns + λms ) + yu(λnu + λmu )]
¸
(69)
So, a tax rate of 1 is eﬃcient if
λns ys + λnuyu <
(λns + λms )ys + (λnu + λmu )yu
1 + λms + λmu
(42)
and a tax rate of 0 is eﬃcient if
λns ys + λnuyu >
(λns + λms )ys + (λnu + λmu )yu
1 + λms + λmu
(43)
QED.
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